Adaptive Incentive Mechanisms for Gig Workers Using Reinforcement Learning and Behavioral Nudges under Platform Economies

Authors

  • Deorge Blening Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA.
  • Gtanley Trebory Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA.
  • Geon Jarsen Department of Computer Science, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, USA.

Keywords:

gig economy, adaptive incentives, reinforcement learning, behavioral nudges, platform governance, algorithmic fairness, worker welfare, socio-technical systems

Abstract

The rapid expansion of platform economies has transformed labor markets by enabling flexible, task-based gig work. However, the inherent precarity and algorithmic management of gig workers often lead to issues of low engagement, high turnover, and unequal earnings. Traditional fixed incentives fail to account for the dynamic and heterogeneous preferences of workers across time and context. This paper proposes a novel framework for adaptive incentive mechanisms that integrates reinforcement learning with behavioral nudges to dynamically adjust rewards, goals, and feedback in real time. We present a system architecture that learns worker-specific response patterns through continuous interaction and leverages insights from behavioral economics to design choice architectures that enhance productivity and well-being without compromising autonomy. The framework is evaluated through structural trade-offs among efficiency, fairness, explainability, and scalability. We discuss deployment challenges on existing digital platforms, including data privacy, algorithmic transparency, and the risk of manipulation. A cross-domain analysis compares lessons from ride-hailing, microtasking, and home services. Policy implications are drawn regarding worker classification, algorithmic accountability, and the ethical boundaries of nudging. By synthesizing reinforcement learning and behavioral science, the proposed approach offers a pathway toward more sustainable and equitable platform labor systems.

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Published

2026-04-30

How to Cite

Deorge Blening, Gtanley Trebory, & Geon Jarsen. (2026). Adaptive Incentive Mechanisms for Gig Workers Using Reinforcement Learning and Behavioral Nudges under Platform Economies. Global Financial Analytics Research Review, 1(1). Retrieved from https://gfarr.org/index.php/home/article/view/129